Recent developments in private payments arrangements, particularly at the wholesale level, (including recent innovations in China) challenge central banks' longstanding monopoly on the provision of the ultimate means of settlement for financial transactions. This paper examines competition between public payments arrangements and private intermediaries, and the effect on central banks' role in monetary policy. Central to the issue is the role of collateral both as a requirement for participation in central bank sponsored payments
arrangements and as the backing for private intermediary arrangements. The presence of private systems serves as a check on the ability of a monetary authority to tighten monetary policy.
Over recent decades, payments arrangements have undergone unprecedented changes. Nonetheless, standard macroeconomics continues to treat payments as primarily based on public systems. Roughly speaking the basic model is one in which commercial banks rely on the central bank's reserves in order to make payments. In turn, the central bank engages in monetary policy by affecting the aggregate amount of reserves, trading non-reserve assets for reserve assets, and thereby in a more-or-less mechanical way increasing the totality of assets which can be used as means of payments-that is, the money supply.
This view of payments arrangements, with government fiat money as the base and centerpiece of a modern economy's methods of payments, is at odds with a host of developments in private payments arrangements over recent decades. 1 It is true that some recent payments innovations arguably leave the basic structure unaltered: While the rise of credit cards has been an important change in payment for retail economic activity, it might still be claimed that it makes no "fundamental" difference to the system, because, at the end of the month, every transaction translates one-for-one into a payment (or almost every transaction-default does occur), and that payment passes through an account in some commercial bank somewhere. And since commercial banks "ultimately" depend on central bank reserves and "ultimately" settle with one another through central bank payments systems, central banks are still at the core of the arrangement-with only a money multiplier as a minor caveat.
Other developments, however, cannot so easily be dismissed. In the UK, the increased concentration of payments into a handful of major settlement banks through "tiering" has meant that an increasing proportion of economic activity is payed through "on-us" transfers within a bank's accounts, never reaching the central system. Intrabank activity is increasingly likely to take place through private settlement arrangements. In the US, CHIPS-a private, cooperatively-owned arrangement among major financial institutionshas activity equal to something like 80% of the value of the activity on Fedwire, the Federal Reserve's system. And although net settlement on CHIPS passes through Fedwire at the end of the day, the techniques used by CHIPS to effect netting of payments among its participants means that the amounts appearing on Fedwire are orders of magnitude smaller than the actual activity. 2 The story is the same for CLS, the recently developed private system for settling international, multicurrency transactions. 3 Throughput on this system is now fifteen times world GDP, and one hundred times the ultimate settlement of these transactions on central bank books. Not only is transactions velocity staggering on these advanced netting systems, it varies radically with economic conditions-in recent unsettled periods, daily value of transactions on CLS were double the "normal" high-volume days. In other words, the variations are unaffected by central bank activity.
Perhaps most challenging from the point of view of central bankers is the rise in private "offshore" settlement arrangements. In Hong Kong, in particular, two major banks have set up entirely private arrangements for making payments in both dollars and sterling. These systems have no official connection-legal or regulatory-to the U.S. or the U.K. Value and volume on these systems does not depend on the institutions holdings of British or American central bank reserves; instead it is determined by demands for the service in the Far East, and its capacity is constrained only by limits to the reputation of the banks running the arrangements. (Similar arrangements are available in India and are now becoming available in the rest of China). 4 For several years theoretical monetary economists have pondered what it would mean for central bank reserves no longer to serve as the "ultimate" means of settlement. 5 But the developments have made clear that central banks reserves could cease to be relevant long before they cease to be ultimate. In other words, the capacity of a private payments system to carry out transactions relies less and less on the degree to which the system has access to government reserves, and more and more on the credibility of the 2 For a discussion of the complementary and competitive relationships between CHIPS and Fedwire, see Rochet and Tirole (1996) . Figures on Fedwire and CHIPS can be found in Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2010). 3 For an early introduction to CLS see Kahn and Roberds (2001) . 4 An earlier example was a dollar system set up in Japan by Chase-Tokyo (an example for which I thank Bruce Summers). The Eurodollar market is an even earlier example. To the extent that the bank setting up the system has a presence in the country of the currency, the regulator retains leverage over it. It is thus particularly noteworthy that in the case of China, the banks in charge of the payments arrangements are primarily Chinese entities. 5 For opposing views see Goodhart (2000) , Woodford (2000) .
institution as an ongoing entity. It is not reserves which back the system and limit its scale but attachable assets of reliable value-collateral. Collateral is also central to participation in public payments arrangements. In CHAPS and TARGET-the large value systems of, respectively, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank-collateral must be posted by participants in order to have access to overdrafts on their accounts needed for engaging in transactions during the course of the day. While interest rates on the collateralized borrowing are extremely low, they still carry an opportunity cost: collateral tied up in central bank systems cannot be used for backing other activity.
Since the amount of money (overdrafts and reserves) in a system during the daylight hours far exceeds the reserves on central bank books overnight, a disconnect has begun to arise between two forms of "monetary" policydaylight and overnight-for which government collateral policy and interest rates differ. For major particpants these intraday collateral requirements are likely to be more significant than the reserve requirements established by the central banks on overnight positions. (Fedwire, unusually among central bank systems, allows uncollateralized intraday overdrafts, but in effect makes the same restrictions through more informal means.) Evidence of the significance of the collateral requirements for participants in CHAPS and TARGET comes from the pressure these banks have brought on the institutions to allow greater flexibility in these requirements. 6 How can we make sense of these changes? How do financial institutions decide on the use of their collateral and their participation in these systems? What are the consequences for operation of payments systems and for the effectiveness of central bank monetary policy? In this paper we will make a start at answering these questions by developing a model of competition between public and private payments arrrangements. While a monetary au- 6 And while this is going on within individual national payment systems, increasingly global banking conglomerates are handling payments around the world on a 24 hour basis. The latest twist in this environment is the increasing ease with which collateral can be transferred into and out of national payment system arrangements. Within the trading day, banks now can increase or decrease the collateral in a system, readjusting its use for other activities. Central banks have aided the process by increasingly allowing members to use as collateral securities of foreign governments. And the rise of agreements between central banks for easy shifting of collateral from one national system to another means that the day is not far off when collateral could be shifted around the world following the trading activities of payments systems around the clock. See Kahn (2009) for an application of the models of this paper to "round-the-clock" payments arrangements.
thority will have interest rate policies available to it, a central role in the model will be played by collateral, and the real effects of the system will be related to costs of generating collateral.
Sometimes the costs of collateral have been ignored in analyzing payments arrangements or monetary policy-as if there were a sea of the stuff out there, so large that it can be pressed into service as needed for free. In periods of liquidity crisis, as we have seen recently, this is clearly not the case. 7 But even in normal times, when the costs of putting existing collateral into service are small, a bank's managers must weigh the costs of including in its portfolio assets that can be collateralized should the need arise as opposed to more lucrative, but more opaque non collateralizable investments. These decisions may well have significant effects on an economy.
It is probable that over recent decades, the cost of provision of collateral has decreased, and the elasticity of supply of collateral has increased. But what the effects of this on payments activity and monetary policy are is less clear, particularly in the presence of private payments competition. The models of this paper are intended as a starting point for addressing such questions.
The model we develop is an extension of Berentsen-Monnet (2008) to examine competition between private and public payment systems, focusing on collateral as both a constraint on private systems and a policy choice for public systems. Berentsen-Monnet in turn is based on Lagos-Wright (2005)'s "day-night" models. 8 As this is a first attempt to address these issues, many simplifications will be included. We will focus on tradeoffs between the costs of collateralization and current consumption; the possibility of additional productive investments will be ignored. We will focus on the situation where central banks use "channel systems" to carry out monetary policy-that is, they establish nominal lending and borrowing rates for central bank funds. However, we will compare the results at several points with the case where at least part of the money supply is outside money. Since we adopt the quasi-linearity of the Lagos-Wright framework, there will be no long-term risk aversion motivating the holding of liquid assets. The role of money is solely a means of payment and the need for a means of payment arises solely from the problem of limited enforcement. Individuals face uncertainty about demand for consumption, which leads to a precautionary motive for money holding. There is no aggregate uncertainty-an extension which will be important for linking the model to more macroeconomic issues. Nonetheless, competition between private and public payments arrangements will have important consequences for policy, even in this extremely simple set-up.
The model
Agents have a common discount factor  per day. Each day is divided into two periods; for convenience there is no discounting between periods within a day. In the first period ("morning") all individuals are identifiable. In the second ("afternoon") individuals are anonymous; thus they will need a means of payment to make purchases in this period.
There are two goods; one can be produced and consumed in the mornings and the other can be produced and consumed in the afternoons. All agents can produce morning goods at a cost of 1 per unit. If consumed immediately, the morning good gives a utility of 1 per unit. If a unit is produced one morning and placed in a storage technology (available to all agents), it provides  units of utility the following morning. We will assume that   1 so that agents will not desire, in the absence of other considerations, to produce for storage.
Each period an individual faces uncertainty about preferences and productivity with respect to afternoon good. In each period a fraction  of the agents can produce but not consume afternoon good. For such agents the cost of production is 1 per unit. A fraction 1 −  can consume and not produce. For such agents utility is (), an increasing concave function satisfying the Inada conditions. Individuals learn which group they belong to in any period at the beginning of the afternoon; these draws are serially uncorrelated. The afternoon good is not storable.
We number periods  = {0 1 2 } even numbers denoting morning periods. For  even, let   be an agent's net production of newly produced morning good at time  (production less consumption),  +1 his production of afternoon good if the agent is an afternoon producer and  +1 his consumption of afternoon good if the agent is an afternoon consumer at time  + 1, and  +2 consumption in period  + 2 of morning good stored from period . The quantities   can be positive or negative;       and  +2 must be non negative.
For ease of presentation, we will focus on three periods, a morning (period 0) an afternoon (period 1) and the following morning (period 2). Then an agent's expected utility over the three periods is
Consumption in period 2 can depend on the period 1 realizations; we will let subscripts  and  denote period 2 choices conditional on the agent turning out to be a buyer or seller respectively in period 1 The so-called "quasilinearity" of the utility function (Lagos-Wright, 2005 ) allows us to isolate the problem to these three periods when convenient.
Non-Monetary Equilibria
We begin by considering equilibria in this economy in the absence of monetary instruments. We will consider two possibilities: one in which agents are "trustworthy," so that afternoon trades can be handled by uncollateralized credit, and another in which the storable commodity is exchanged to resolve the problem of anonymity in afternoon markets. We let  +2  ( even) represent the period  + 2 price of morning good produced in period  relative to newly produced morning good.
Trustworthy agents
Proposition 1 If agents are trustworthy, then in any equilibrium, afternoon consumers consume  * units of afternoon good, where
No storage occurs in equilbrium, and for  even,
This proposition is proved in appendix A.3. We will call  * the efficient or "full-trust" level of output. Appendix A.1 shows that equilibrium with trustworthy agents is equivalent to a Walrasian equilibrium. In the Walrasian equilbrium, prices deflate period by period at the rate  meaning that individuals are indifferent between choices of working one period or the next, or of consuming newly produced morning good one period or another.
It is also useful to consider the relative price of afternoon goods in terms of various morning goods in this Walrasian equilibrum. Afternoon good in period one trades one-for-one for morning good in period 0; thus afternoon good has a price  −1 relative to morning good of period 2. Its shadow price relative to the morning good stored from period 0 to period 2 is in the range [1 ()
−1 ]  (The amount stored in the equilibrium is in fact zero, but if we were to perturb the equilibrium slightly by providing some old morning good in period 2 (or in period 1), then () −1 would be the price of afternoon good relative to this old morning good.)
Because of the linearity of costs and of preferences for morning goods, individual consumptions and productions of morning good are indeterminate. However, when comparing this economy with the rest of our examples in which agents are not trustworthy, it is natural to focus on the allocation in which all "debts" are paid the next period. In other words, afternoon consumers provide output the next morning equal in value to their previous afternoon consumption-that is, each provides  *  units of morning good, and each ex-producer receives
Commodity payment
Given that agents are not trustworthy, it will not be possible to borrow for consumption in the afternoon market. An afternoon consumer could, nonetheless, pay by trading with stored good. We can think of each agent as producing in period  the amount  +2 for storage; if he is an afternoon consumer, he will pay for consumption with stored good; if he is an afternoon producer he will hold his stored good plus any afternoon receipts for consumption the next morning. In this case, the resultant equilibria contain the analogue of a cash-in-advance constraint: each agent maximizes utility subject to period-by-period budget constraints, including the requirement that
for  even, where  +2 is the amount of period  morning good stored (and ultimately consumed by someone in period +2), and  +1 is the "spot price" of afternoon good in period  + 1 relative to stored morning good. Note that production of  +2 cannot depend on whether the agent turns out to be a consumer or producer in period  + 1 Determination of equilibrium in this case is aided by the following considerations: As of the afternoon, producers value the stored morning good at  per unit. Given constant marginal costs, sellers make zero profits in the afternoon. Since agents do not know whether they will be sellers or buyers, they choose a storage level  in the morning to solve the following problem:
In other words, if buyers, they sell their storage for afternoon good; if sellers, they hold their own storage until the next period. Since  =  we have the first order condition:
Armed with this information one can quickly verify the first part of the following proposition. The entirety is proved in appendix A.3.
Proposition 2
If agents can only pay for afternoon consumption with stored morning goods then in the competitive equilibrium afternoon consumers consume e  where
In equilibrium, for  even
We will call e , the level of consumption under commodity payment ("the barter level"). Since there is no intertemporal market on which afternoon good can be sold we only have spot rates of exchange between the two goods available for trade. Note that the left side of the equation defining e  is greater than 1 so that e    *  and afternoon good becomes expensive relative to stored morning good. Note that agents anticipate a capital loss on the stored good. They are willing to store the good despite the fact its value will shrink with certainty between period 0 and period 1. The difference is the liquidity premium on the morning good.
Collateralized Borrowing
This equilibrium can be given a second interpretation: suppose rather than using the stored good as an outright payment, the agents treat it as collateral; the good is held by the seller until period 2 when it is returned to the buyer in return for new morning good of equal value. Clearly this interpretation makes no substantive change in the account. But it does allow us to extend the analysis to the case where the collateral value is greater or less than the value of the goods purchased with it. It also allows us explicitly to consider interest rates for borrowing or lending between periods 1 and 2. We will include that possibility in considering the individual maximization problem, with two different rates. Of course, in the competitive equilibrium, borrowing and lending rates will be the same, but by treating them separately we will be able to use the analysis for more general situations later. Specifically, assume traders in the afternoon engage in a "repo" transaction: buyers borrow by making a loan of morning good which will then be returned the following morning when the borrowing is repaid. Now buyers rather than sellers consume the old morning good, and instead buyers produce new morning good to make their payments. With linear technologies this exchange is a wash. Now we can consider "haircuts"-transactions in which the value of the collateral exceeds the value the goods received-and "loans on margin"-in which the collateral only represents a fraction of the loan value. To the extent that there are non-pecuniary costs to default, it is not necessary to require full collateral to ensure repayment. To the extent that there may be adverse selection in the collateral posted, collateral value on average will have to exceed the value of the loan.
We will let  denote the fraction of the loan value which must be collateralized; thus   1 represents an incompletely collateralized loan, and   1 represents a haircut. Thus  = 0 is the equivalent of trustworthy agents;  = ∞ is an economy where commodities cannot be used to make purchases (in other words, autarky, in the absence of government-provided money).
At a cost of 1 an individual manufactures a collateral good in the morning. He can use it to guarantee payment for purchase in the afternoon and will, in any case consume the collateral good the next day, at a present value of  per unit. Thus the net cost of collateral provision is (1 − ) In the afternoon suppliers produce and demanders purchase afternoon good. The collateral good gives an inferior amount of consumption in period 2, but relaxes the constraint on afternoon consumption. The agent's problem
Here  is the price of afternoon good in terms of period 2 morning good. Because of constant returns to scale, and positive production, we have that  =  −1 ; in equilibrium the relative price of afternoon good and good the subsequent morning must be equal to the marginal rate of substitution between them. As the appendix shows, the first order conditions reduce to the following:
We can use the condition to implicitly define a function(); the equilibrium output level for given collateral requirements. If  = 1 this condition reduces to the condition (2) determining the level of output under commodity payment. As  approaches 0 the condition approaches (1) and consumption approaches the trustworthy agents case. In general output decreases with increasing costs of using the system (increases in  or decreases in ).
Government Monopoly on Money
Next we consider a government which has a monopoly on the provision of means of payment in the economy. Let    ( even) denote the nominal period  price of newly produced morning good, and   ( odd) denote the period  price of afternoon good. The cleanest case to consider is the case of zero initial money balances: Each morning, government supplies money elastically at fixed terms; with repayment to the government on the next morning. In Appendix A.4, we show that the results carry over to the case where agents begin the initial period with a positive stock of nominal money balances, and consider as well the case of a steady state monetary policy, in which government adjusts money supply to maintain a constant real balance and constant rate of inflation. The analysis in this section and the corresponding parts of the appendix closely follow Berentsen-Monnet (2008) .
The first thing to note is that the level of prices in the model is indeterminate. In other words, for arbitrary positive  2 , the government can make an announcement of a willingness to buy or sell  2 units of money in return for one unit of morning goods in period 2. While government supply of money is then completely elastic at this price, private agents' aggregate supply of and demand for money in period 2 are completely inelastic and equal. Thus money trades at the government's specified price. However the real money supply is independent of the stated price. Prices adjust so that by selling a unit of afternoon good, a producer can purchase 1 units of period 2 morning good. If there is no opportunity cost associated with borrowing money then each agent will borrow enough to purchase  * units. No storage of morning goods takes place, and the real per capita money supply in the economy (call it the "overnight money supply") is  *  valued in period 1 goods, or  * valued in period 2 goods. In this case, the marginal rate of substitution between morning and afternoon goods is 1 so that  0 =  2  that is, prices deflate in line with the discount rate. If the process is repeated then in each period a smaller nominal amount of government money is borrowed.
In this economy the government can conduct a monetary policy by establishing a (nominal) interest rate for money it lends to the public. Let the interest rate be denoted    For completeness and clarity we can also consider that anyone holding money at the end of the afternoon can deposit it with the government overnight, and receive a deposit rate,   also determined by the government. Clearly, all money supplied by the government will end up in overnight deposits. Following Berentsen and Monnet, it is convenient to use the proportional spread between interest rates
as one indicator of the government's policy. The government is restricted to ∆ ≥ 1; otherwise there will be arbitrage opportunities. If the government sets the two rates to be equal (call it ), then there is no real effect. The government can announce an arbitrary value for money on the following morning; given this value, the price of afternoon goods in period 1 is  1 = (1 + ) −1  2  and again each individual borrows enough to purchase  *  Valued at period 2 prices and including interest, the real value of the money supply is unchanged. Valued at period 1 prices, it is smaller by the anticipated interest payments. The interest payments are also built into the inflation rate:
and if 1 +  =  −1 prices remain constant, period to period. On the other hand, a spread between the interest rates does have real effects. First note that with a spread in interest rates, the public must in aggregate pay back more money on any day than is available to it. The difference is assumed to be distributed lump-sum by the government to the population as a whole; thus each pair of interest rates entails an associated (negative) tax policy. 9 As the interest rate spread increases, the use of money decreases. In this case
and
(For a demonstration, see the results in appendix A.4, of which these calculations are a special case). In other words, inflation is determined by the average of interest rates faced by buyers and sellers, and economic activity is reduced by the spread in rates.
In the United States until recently, that the monetary authorty did not pay interest on monetary assets, so that   = 0 Then increases in the borrowing rate on monetary assets decreases economic activity and reduces prices today relative to future prices.
Note that as long as the interest rate spread remains low, no agent would actually find it useful to attempt to use commodity money. However, as the interest spread increases beyond a critical level
an incentive arises to develop private alternatives to government money. The next section considers competition between private and public providers of payments services.
Of course a monetary authority could also require that participants provide collateral in return for borrowing. An individual who borrows one dollar from the government must repay 1 +   the next morning. He must post  dollars worth of collateral value per dollar owed (measured in next period's prices). He will pay  1 per unit of good bought. Thus he must post  1 (1 +   )( 2 ). As a result, the level of consumption of afternoon good falls further. Again, the Appendix A.4 carries out these calculations in greater generality.
Competition between private and public systems
Now we consider competition between publicly-provided collateralized money and private collateralized loans. The chosen mixture of payments systems within the economy will depend on the costs imposed by the government provided system. Government costs come in two forms-collateral requirements and interest spreads. Appendix A.5 provides a detailed model of these choices, with mixture between private and public payments arrangements responding smoothly to policy variables. Here we begin with brief descriptions of a simplified account in which required collateral in the private system takes a special form: a constant proportion of value to be borrowed. In this case, the equilibrium solution has a "bang-bang" form: if the government chooses policy variables which are too high, all traffic moves from the public system to the private system. In the more general case, collateral required will be a convex function of the amounts borrowed.
Fixed proportions of collateral required
In this section we start with the problem in the even more special case where interest charges on money balances are zero-that is, setting  = 0 10 What is new in the arrangement is that the agents can choose between two ways of providing payments. The agent's problem becomes
The appendix deals in detail with the additional complications which arise when  is no longer zero and the assumption of a linear collateral technology is dropped. The major advantagea of the simpler account in the text are two: 1) We do not need to distinguish prices for goods in different payment systems (as opposed to, for example discounts or surcharges that arise in the real world when using differing forms of payment systems as the costs of using them diverge). 2) We are able to aggregate the two collateral constraints into a single constraint.
where
The first constraint is the budget constraint if the agent turns out to be a seller, the second is the budget constraint if the agent turns out to be a buyer: either way, the sales in periods 1 must finance consumption purchases in period 2 and vice versa. The third constraint is the collateral constraint: any shortfall in payment for afternoon good that is not met by private collateralized loans must be met by borrowed money. First order conditions are listed in the appendix. Now the choice of use of private or public payment simply boils down to the question of which requires the more expensive haircut. Holding second period prices fixed, an increase in the haircut on borrowing money lowers the demand for money and reduces afternoon consumption. The reduction in the afternoon consumption reduces demand for collateral and thus morning prices of goods. However, once the haircut exceeds that required for private borrowing, demand for money falls to zero, and further increases in haircuts have no effect on the economy. This does not affect the money price of goods in period 2; the government still continues to be willing to redeem money from any holder at a price  2  Thus the amount of consumption of afternoon good in the economy is (min{ }) (recall that() is implicitly defined by (3)). Next, consider how the result changes if agents can either use interest bearing publicly-provided money, or make private arrangements on their own. In either case they must post collateral in advance. Money interest rates are a policy variable of the government as before. The new consideration that arises is that terms for private arrangements must be set competitively. Let  be the money price in period 2 that a private borrower agrees to pay for a unit of afternoon good purchased in period 1 The equivalent value in collateral in period 2 is ( 2 ) A private borrower must post collateral  = ( 2 ) per unit of afternoon good purchased in a private loan. An individual who borrows one dollar from the government must repay 1 +   the next morning. He must post  dollars of collateral value per dollar owed. He will pay  1 per unit of good bought. Thus he must post  =  1 (1 +   )( 2 ).
A seller who receives a dollar in period 1 will deposit it overnight and have (1 +   ) dollars in period 2. Thus a seller who sells a unit for money will have  1 (1 +   ) dollars in period 2. A seller who receives a promise to pay for a unit will have  dollars in period 2.
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Thus for a seller to be indifferent between methods, it must be that
For the two methods to co-exist, Appendix A.5 shows that the following condition must hold:
If the left side is greater, then only private payment arrangements are used, and the equilibrium is as in section 3. If the right side is greater, only public payment arrangements are used and the equilibrium is as in section 2. For example, as the government increases the spread ∆ activity in the economy falls, until the spread reaches the level
From then on, further spreads have no effect, since the economy substitutes private payments arrangements for public ones. Similarly, increasing interest rate levels affects inflation. However, once the critical level is exceeded, then this has no significance: since public money is not actually used, the private loans could be denominated in any real good, and inflation would be irrelevant.
Variable Collateral Requirements for Private Loans
So far we have not addressed the issue of the source of the collateral requirements. While public requirements are largely a policy variable, private requirements depend on reliability, information, incentives and enforcement considerations. In practice, payments arrangements have collateral requirements which vary with the identity of the participants and the amount of their participation. Private systems place a variety of restrictions on membership and collateral requirements for participants, including differentiation between various classes of participants. As a result, only the larger and (presumably) better collateralized institutions participate in the private systems directly.
Appendix A.5 considers the possibility that collateral requirements are an increasing convex function of the value borrowed. The important consequence is that changes in the collateral requirements of the public system yield continuous responses in the use of the private system. For example, increased collateral requirements in the public system induce a move to the private system by some institutions who would formerly have found the private requirements too stringent.
Monetary Policy when Private Payment Competes
The above analysis makes clear that, at least to the extent that monetary policy is intended to affect the real economy, it can do so by changing the margin along which agents divide between the use of private and public payment systems. In particular, in this model when payment requires the use of costly collateral, agents will increase their production of such collateral, distorting the trade-off between collateral-dependent and collateral-independent purcahses. In a more general model this would translate to a "liquidity preference" decision-a choice of dividing investments between collateralizable and (presumably higher return) uncollateralizable assets. However, in the model, this power to affect the real economy is selflimiting. As the monetary authority increases the expense of using the public system, by increasing collateral requirements or by increasing the interest rate on borrowed money, agents abandon the public system. In the extreme, all activity takes place through private payments and the monetary authority is unable to effect further tightening on the economy. Monetary policy retains the ability to affect the price level-that is, the posted money price for goods. But it is a Pyrrhic victory: the activity of the economy can actually be carried out in real terms, with private lending based on real interest rates and repayments specified in real terms. The "official" nominal prices are only of academic interest.
Several important limitations remain on the analysis as presented in this paper. Probably the most important one is the lack of aggregate shocks. Given that monetary policy is a tool for stabilization, introduction of such shocks into the model is a priority. A second important aspect of ignoring economy wide shocks is that this tends to bias our analysis in favor of private systems. In times of distress, many patrons of private systems are likely to switch to use of a public system because of its extra safety. (See the discussion in Summers, 1998 . For a historical examination of other preceived drawbacks to private payments arrangements, see Summers and Gilbert, 1996) .
The model also ignores the central feature of neo-Keynesian analysis: price stickiness. To the extent that prices are posted and sticky nominally, the authority retains some power. But as the private payments arrangements take over, we could easily imagine that the pricing of the private system is indexed to something other than the official currency, and that agents in the economy find it more convenient to price in those terms. Of course this is the situation observed in chronic inflations, where prices become pegged to a stable foreign currency. Governments will take comfort in the fact that this movement to indexation of everyday prices does not appear to occur for moderate levels of inflation.
Additional generalizations to the model are also desirable, the most important among them being endogenizing the haircut  by developing better microfoundations for collateral, and allowing for competing investment goods with positive returns (along these lines see for example Heider 
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The issue of private competition with public payments arrangements is, of course, not new. 12 In an important early paper Wallace (1983) argues, in the context of retail payment systems, that the only reasons that U.S. government issued interest bearing securities do not replace non-interest bearing Federal Reserve Notes as a transaction medium are their non-negotiability (in the case of savings bonds) and limitation to large denominations (in the case of treasury bills). But private intermediaries could solve the latter problem in particular, and make a profit, by establishing narrow banks which hold large value treasuries and issue small-denomination, riskless private notes suitable for payment. The lack of such notes in the U.S. is clearly due to legal restriction (notably, in Scotland, such legal restrictions are still not in place, and commercial banks do issue their own circulating notes). In an intriguing footnote (p.4), Wallace asks if checking accounts might in effect play the same role. He then states that "interest ceilings, reserve requirements, zero marginal-cost check clearing by the Federal Reserve and the failure to tax income in the form of transaction services ... explain the way checking account services have been priced." In the context of retail banking in the U.S. nowadays,it is hard to argue that any of these considerations make a significant difference. Thus the following sentences of the footnote become the relevant ones: "In the absence of these forms of government interference, most observers predict that checking accounts would pay interest at the market rate with charges levied on a per transaction basis"-a prediction that seems largely to have come true.
But then, in Wallace's view, provided the public and private arrangements have the same ability to effect payments, an open market operation which reduces the available reserves of treasury bills to commercial banks and substitutes central bank money simply shifts payments services from private to public arrangements, without affecting interest rates, prices or economic activity. This is equivalent to our arrangement in which  =  and interest rates are nil. Wallace assumes, unlike us, that the government has the possibility of restricting the payments in the system through legal requirements. On the other hand he assumes that the government system is constrained not to incur losses. Under these circumstances, there is an upper bound on the interest rate on default free securities when they co exist with non interest bearing government currency. Sargent and Wallace (1982) use the overlapping generations framework of Samuelson (1958) to examine the "real-bills doctrine." In their framework, a fiat currency can compete with private credit instruments. Differences in endowments in alternating generations lead to a natural variation in relative prices of consumption good in adjacent periods. If fiat money and private lending coexist, then the return on the two must be the same, that is, the nominal interest rate on lending must be zero. When a monetary equilibrium exists there are a continuum of equilibria in general, each consistent with a different initial value of a unit of fiat money. Monetary equilibria exist as long as the population is not "too impatient." In all of these monetary equilibria but one, the value of money goes asymptotically to zero. In the remaining equilibrium, the value of money remains stationary, fluctuating with the periodicity of endowments; goods prices and money stock are positively correlated. (In addition there is always a nonmonetary equilibrium, in which private borrowing and lending occurs, but money does not effect intergenerational changes.) Sargent and Wallace then consider a restriction so that some households cannot engage in private lending (because of a minimum restriction on the size of privately issued securities), forcing them to hold government issued securities. If these securities have lower return than private securities in equilbrium, rich savers hold the private securities, and the difference in returns implies suboptimal equilibria, despite the fact that by constraining the poor lenders from the market, price fluctuation can be eliminated. Sargent and Wallace argue that use of government borrowing at low levels will undo the restriction on small bills. Goodhart (2000) considers the role of central bank in a world where electronic payments have become dominant. He has two arguments in favor of the continuing importance of the central bank: the first is that currency and electronic moneys are imperfect substitutes, particularly with regard to privacy. The second, which he contrasts to "free banking" approaches of the papers described above, is that a central bank, as a bank for a government, is able to run losses financed by the govenment's tax levying powers. Using the government's deep pockets, the central bank can always wrest control of the money supply from the private provides by standing ready to engage in loss-making open market operations. The public's knowledge of the bank's power to do so, means that in fact these activities do not need to be car-ried out much of the time; instead the bank can engage in "open-mouth" operations. Goodhart has in mind the exchange of central bank notes for government debt, or possibly the purchase of private bank debt. However, as we have seen, in a world where provision of private bank debt is only constrained by the availability of collateralizable assets the crucial determinant of the power of a central bank to restrict the money supply is the elasticity of the supply of collateralizable assets.
The issue of the role of cross-border collateral has been examined in several papers by central bankers. Manning and Willison (2006) examine crosscountry provision of collateral, when collateral is expensive, banks engage in activity in multiple countries, and delay in payment is costly. They show that in many circumstances permitting cross-border collateral induces banks to increase the pool of collateral available for backing payments. This becomes important in the case where there is uncertainty in the overall demand for payment.
Conclusions
This paper has developed a model in which technologies for effecting payment provide real benefits to an economy. Ultimately through its powers of taxation, a government may have a natural comparative advantage in generating assets that can be used for payment. To the extent that it has a monopoly power over these assets, its choices for pricing them-in effect, its monetary policy-will have real effects on an economy. This power becomes the leverage with which a monetary authority can encourage or discourage economic activity in order to achieve policy goals.
However, when there exist alternative, non-public means of effecting payments, the central authority's power to affect economic activity becomes limited. When, in an attempt to reduce activity, a central bank makes payments assets more expensive, either by increasing the spread between borrowing and lending rates on the asset, or increasing the haircut required in terms of collateral, agents readjust by substituting away from public payment systems into private ones. As private systems become more effective at handling payment services, the leeway available to central banks in maintaining restrictive monetary policies is reduced.
In the framework as analyzed thus far, we have assumed that a single public entity competes with private payment providers. In the world today, in fact, the situation is more complicated: rather than a single public entity, we in fact have multiple public entities providing payment services, in effect, sequentially, through the course of the day. Extensions to this model will examine the implications for cross-border use of collateral in a world of roundthe-clock payments activity.
A Appendix

A.1 Trustworthy Agents: Walrasian Model
When individuals can borrow subject only to their overall budget constraint, the equilibrium reduces to a Walrasian equilibrium. In this Walrasian equilibrium, let   ( even) represent the price of morning goods produced and delivered in time  Let   ( odd) represent the price of afternoon goods produced and delivered in time  and let  +2 represent the price of morning good produced in period  and sold in period  + 2
In the Walrasian equilibrium, markets clear, and choices maximize expected utility of consumers:
From this we have the following conditions where  is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint, and where paired inequalities hold with complementary slackness:
The profit maximization problem for producers using the storage technology:
with strict inequality only if no morning good is stored for later consumption. The Inada conditions mean that in equilibrium  1  0 Thus the conditions simplify to
The conditions for market clearing are
From the last condition, if  0  0 then one of the terms on the right side must be positive as well, and therefore  =  2  0  But then storage is positive so  2  0 = 1 a contradiction. The price 
+2 
in the text is simply  2  2 
A.2 A General Model
The models we examine in the text can all be regarded as special cases of the following equilibrium problem.
Agents choose these quantities:
 net production of morning good in period 0.   and    amounts of period 0 morning good production used as collateral in government and private payments systems, respectively.   and    amounts of period 1 afternoon good produced and sold in return for payments in government and private payments arrangements, respectively.
  and    amounts of period 1 afternoon good purchased in return for payments in government and private payments arrangements, respectively.   and    net consumption of period 2 morning good, by consumers and producers ("buyers" and "sellers") of period 1 afternoon good.  2 and  2  final nominal holdings of money balances by buyers and sellers.
 and  can be positive or negative; all other quantities are non-negative. These choices are made to maximize expected utility
The fact that final money balances are in the objective function is in this case innocuous: if we were to work through a recursive dynamic programming problem, we would conclude that 1 2 is simply the shadow value of money in the next period's value function. Prices in the model are as follows:  0 , 2 money prices of newly produced morning good in periods 0 and 2.  1 , money price of afternoon good in period 1.  12 price in terms of next period money of a collateralized loan for the purchase of one unit of afternoon good in period 1.
     interest rates paid to (from) the government for overnight money balances, set by the government along with the government collateral requirements. Following Berentsen and Monnet, it is convenient to use the proportional spread between interest rates
as one indicator of the government's policy. With interest paid in money, there is no guarantee that the nominal supply of outside money is the same from period to period. For completeness therefore we need to consider the possibility that the government distributes or collects money balances from the population. Assume that at the beginning of period 2, the government collects (distributes, if negative) in a lump sum fashion  nominal units of money per person. Given the quasilinearity of agent preferences, this has no effect on decisions other than the rebalancing of money holdings that occurs each morning.
Market clearing conditions are as follows:
In the last condition,  2 is the nominal supply of money in the final period. (This last condition is redundant, given budget constraints). Agents borrow money from or lend money to the government in period 1. There are two budget constraints, one for agents who turn out to be consumers in period 1 and one for agents who turn out to be producers in period 1.
The first two terms of the consumer's budget constraint (7) take into account the wedge between government borrowing and lending rates. (The wedge applies to producers as well, but it can be shown that producers never need to borrow from the government in equilibrium, so only one price is relevant for them). As long as ∆ ≥ 1  we can exploit the convexity of the budget set, and write the consumer budget constraint more tractably as two constraints:
where the first binds if the consumer is a net lender to the government, and the second binds if the consumer is a net borrower from the government. In addition, buyers face two collateral constraints, one for expenditures in private systems and one for expenditures in the government system:
In constraint (11) the absolute value of the first term is the cash value in the second period of the collateral the buyer must deposit. The third component of that term is the net cash position as of period 1: intial holdings plus any profits made from morning sales less the dollars used to purchase afternoon good. This amount is multiplied by the interest rate on overnight cash borrowing from the government; for each dollar to be repaid (including interest),  dollars worth of collateral must be deposited with the government. A unit of collateral is worth  2  dollars in period 2, so the second term is the value actually deposited, and in effect this condition indicates the necessary level of collateral    Similarly, constraint (12) says that the value of collateral in the private system must be sufficient to back the real value of purchases of afternoon good made in that system. Let the Lagrange multipliers for constraints (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) be, respectively,
Finally, there is a government budget constraint (equivalently an equation describing the dynamics of the supply of money):
In words, sellers deposit  0 +  1   units of money overnight with the government and receive interest   on these holdings. If buyers spend less than their initial holdings, they too receive interest on the balance; if their monetary expenditures exceed their initial balances, they pay interest. In the morning of period 2, depositors receive their money back, borrowers return their money, all pay lump sum taxes, and the remaining balance constitutes the terminal money supply.
First order conditions are as follows:
The label at the right indicates that the equation is the first order condition with respect to this variable; in the case of inequalities this variable must be equal to or greater than zero with complementary slackness. (First order conditions on  2 are redundant.) Simplifying,
A.3 Absence of Government Payment System
Proof of propositions 1 and 2. In this section, we assume that () is the linear function  We impose the additional constraint that   (and thus   and   ) are zero, as are policy variables        0   and  The Inada conditions on  guarantee that   and therefore   is positive. Therefore  12 =  2  and the conditions simplify to
Given the Inada conditions,   = 0 only if  = 0 and so the above conditions applies, demonstrating the first part of Proposition 1. The formulation does not include the possibility of trading old goods stored until period two for new goods in period two, but it is easy to determine the pricing if such trades were included. Since all agents regard old goods as perfect substitutes for new goods at a rate of  it must be that  As noted in the text, the case  = 1 is equivalent to commodity payment. In this case,  +1 is defined by condition (12) to be equal to  2  12 = 
A.4 Government Monopoly on Money
In this section, we impose the constraint that   (and thus   and   ) are zero. In general the outcomes divide into cases depending on whether the real value of money in a particular period is sufficient to carry out all purchases in a costless fashion, and if not, whether the shortfall is extreme enough to make it worthwhile to borrow costly additional money-that is, on whether  0 is greater than, equal to, or less than  1   
We now present the analysis in detail; the results described in the text are the special case where  0 = 0 To avoid arbitrage opportunities, the government is restricted to combinations (∆ ) satisfying
For simplicity we will confine attention to the case ∆ ≥ 1  2 is exogenous to the problem; consider it to be set by having the monetary authority manage expectations of future prices. Note therefore, that the policy of the monetary authority establishes a real supply of money as of period 2. For each possible value of  2 the equilibrium will establish values for period 0 and period 1 prices. The problem then can be repeated for periods 2 and 3 given a real money supply expected for period 4 and so forth.
Given the Inada conditions on  the first order conditions are as follows:
where   = 0 unless the inequality holds strictly. Note therefore that
in other words, the price of afternoon good  1 guarantees that producers make zero profit: the present value of the sales (including the overnight interest   ) is equal to the cost of production. First, suppose that in equilibrium, the afternoon consumers are net lenders to the government-that is,
This means that  2 = 0 and  1  0 and thus the collateral constraint is not binding:   = 0 and so   = 0 Conditions reduce to
In this region there is no opportunity cost to holding money balancesthat is, prices fall according to the Friedman rule and   =  *  the full-trust level of production. For the collateral constraint not to be binding, the money supply must be large enough that the amount held by each individual is sufficient to purchase his level of afternoon good, (should he turn out to be a buyer):
As long as prices are anticipated to be sufficiently low in the second period, this unconstrained equilibrium occurs. In this case, before taxes, money supply grows at the rate of interest on deposits, so we can also write
thinking of the left side of this inequality as the "overnight" real money supply, with the taxes collected the next morning. Next consider the case where afternoon consumers borrow from the governmentthat is,
Then  1 = 0  2  0 and either  = 0 or    0. Either way, conditions reduce to
Equations (4-5) of the text are then the special case where  = 0 If buyers borrow money from the government, it must be that the initial real money supply is below the critical level needed to purchase    When   =   and  = 1   is the barter level although the availability of outside money will reduce the amount of collateral needed to reach this production, relative to the case of commodity payment. The critical level decreases as the spread between rates grows; it also decreases as collateral requirements increase. If the money supply is below this critical level, no matter how far, the level of afternoon production   remains fixed at the particular lower level defined by (18) . The afternoon money supply cannot sink below the critical level; instead collateralized borrowing makes up the difference. In this region, even if   =   , inflation is greater than the Friedman rule (that is, agents prefer not to hold additional nominal balances beyond those needed for payments purposes). As Berentsen and Monnet note, the spread between lending and borrowing rates has a real effect: wider spreads reduce economic activity. However, holding the proportional spread fixed, the levels of interest rates simply affect inflation (17) .
Finally, if the money supply starts at an intermediate level, so that
then afternoon consumers neither borrow from nor lend to the government. In this case,   = 0 (no collateralized borrowing takes place),
and conditions simplify to
In this intermediate region, the rate of inflation and the level of production both depend on the interest rate paid on deposits (but not on the interest rate the government demands for collateralized borrowing, since none occurs). Given second period prices, higher deposit rates increase economic activity. The effect on inflation is ambiguous; the interest rate on deposits contributes directly to its increase, but by reducing the collateral constraint, it incresases prices today relative to tomorrow. The bounds on  0 in (19) in effect place upper and lower bounds on the rate of change of prices in the economy.
As noted, the case described in the text is simply the special case of  0 = 0 and
-that is, the government redistributes to the population the excess in interest received over interest paid. In this case, the expected price level in period 2 has no real effect on the economy. When there is outside money in the system, the level of  2 has real effects, since the real supply of money reduces the need for collateral.
A.4.1 Steady state money growth
Berentsen and Monnet focus on the case where the real money supply remains constant. In effect, this is an extra condition pinning down  2  Agents start with  0  Define  =  2  There are two cases to consider, depending on whether collateral is used in the steady state. First consider the case where collateral is not used. In such a steady state,
Equating money growth with inflation (equation (21)) we conclude that
In other words, conditional on being in a steady state with no collateral, the level of real activity is completely determined by the fraction of money that the government removes from the economy through taxes in each round. Let ( ) be the amount implicitly defined in (22). In this region, increases in taxes move the steady state closer to the efficient level. For there to be an equilibrium of this form it is necessary and sufficient that the level of activity be limited to the intermediate region described by (19) ; that is, government policy variables (∆     ) are restricted by the following conditions:
(Since the rate of return on money is limited by the discount factor  attempts to shrink the nominal money supply faster than permitted by left limit are inconsistent with the maximum possible deflation in steady state.) Since the per capita money stock in this middle case is spent on afternoon consumption,( ) determines the price level, and thus the real supply of money:
Next consider the case where collateral is used. In this case, and the condition for a steady state is now
where  2  0 and   satisfy (17) (18) . Substituting for  1 from (14) it can be verified that the condition picks out a unique real money supply  0  0 for each   ,    , and 
A.5 Competition between public and private inside money
Now return to the assumption  0 = 0 Given the market clearing conditions this has the immediate consequence that consumers can not be net lenders of cash to the government, and thus condition (9) is redundant and we can set  1 = 0 First order conditions reduce to
By the Inada conditions, either   or   must be positive.
Case I: If    0  then    0 and from the collateral constraint    0 Then the constraints corresponding to each of these variables hold with equality. The equalities simplify to
Thus, if the government payments system is used, its policy parameters (∆ ) determine the overall level of economic activity   +    For this to be the case, the remaining three inequality conditions must be satisfied.
Values of  12 and   can be found to satisfy them, if and only if the following condition is satisfied:
In this case, any value of  12 in the following range is consistent with equilibrium:
Note that in the monetary equilibrium, price levels are indeterminate, although inflation is determined by levels of interest rates set by the government. Real monetary balances held overnight, however are well defined; they are equal to the amounts borrowed to purchase    Case II: If   = 0  then   = 0 and with zero purchases through the government system, it is optimal for agents to choose   = 0 By Inada conditions,    0 and so   and   are positive as well. The equality constraints now reduce to
and since the left side of the last equality is a decreasing function of   it uniquely determines   To ensure this is an equilibrium, we need to establish the conditions under which a consistent set of shadow prices can be determined for the unused markets. Solutions for the remaining constraints can be found if and only if
In which case the inequality constraints reduce to the conditions that  0 and  1 be chosen in the following ranges:
Although the activity is determined, the money price levels, and even inflation rates, are underdetermined-not surprising since we are positing an equilibrium in which money is not going to be used.
However the real return from private lending is determined to be  −1 − 1 by the condition for  12  2  and this is the only relevant relative price for trading in the economy when the public payment system is not used.
These calculations lead to the following theorem then agents use the government system at least in part, and in equilibrium   +   = Otherwise they use the private system exclusively, and   ≥ Note that as ∆ increases, or  increases, use of the private system increases at the expense of the government system. there are multiple equilibria, in which the private and public system coexist. Otherwise the equilibrium quantities are unique. If the left side is larger, then the equilibrium has only private payments. If the right side is larger the equilibrium has only public payments.
In particular, if the equilibrium involves only public payments, it is a special case of that described in the previous section. If it involves only private payments, then it reduces to condition (13) of Appendix A.3 and the values described in the text follow from the above calculations.
